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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE 1978-79 TERM 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
The latest term of the U.S. Supreme Court ended 
in early July. Following a pattern which first emerged 
in the early 1960's, the Court handed down a signifi-
cant number of decisions involving criminal proce-
dure. This article reviews many of these decisions. 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Several important issues concerning the Fourth 
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search-
es and seizures were decided by the Court. In contrast 
with some recent terms, many of the Court's decisions 
strengthened, rather than weakened, that provision. 
Stop and Frisk 
for a reasonable and brief period of time under care-
fully controlled conditions which are ample to protect 
the individual's Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights." 
People v. Dunaway, 61 App. Div.2d 299, 302, 402 
N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (1978), quoting People v. Morales, 
42 N.Y.2d 129, 135,397 N.Y.S.2d 587,590,366 
N.E.2d 248, 251 (1977). 
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this analysis. In 
the Court's view, upholding the legality of a seizure as 
"intrusive" as Dunaway's "would threaten to swallow 
the general rule that Fourth Amendment seiz.ures are 
'reasonable' only if based on probable cause." 99 
S.Ct. at 2256. The Court emphasized that its deci-
sion did not turn on whether the suspect was in-
formed that he was under arrest: In the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), the Supreme Court recognized for the first 
time that the detention of a person on less than 
probable cause was constitutionally permissible under t certain circumstances. Although the Court found 
~i that such "stops" were "seizures" within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment, they were not violative of 
that clause if based upon reasonable suspicion. A 
number of issues left unresolved by Terry concerning 
the scope of the stop and frisk doctrine were addressed 
by the Court last term. 
Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was 
found. Instead, he was taken from a neighbor's home to 
a police car, transported to a police station, and placed 
in an interrogation room. He was never informed that 
he was "free to go"; indeed; he would have been physi-
cally restrained if he had refused to accompany the offi-
cers or had tried to escape their custody. The applica-
tion of the Fourth Amendment's requirement of prob-
able cause does not depend on whether an intrusion of 
this magnitude is termed an "arrest" under state law. 
The mere facts that petitioner was not told he was under 
arrest, was not "booked," and would not have had an ar-
rest record if the interrogation had proved fruitless ... 
obviously do not make petitioner's seizure even roughly 
analogous to the narrowly defined intrusions involved in 
Terry and its progeny. /d. 
In Dunaway v. New York, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979), 
the Court ruled upon the constitutionality of pro-
longed detentions for the purpose of interrogation, a 
question which it had reserved ten years earlier in 
Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102 (1969). Acting 
upon an informant's tip, which proved insufficient to 
establish probable cause, the police detained Dunaway 
and later transported him to the stationhouse for 
questioning. After receiving Miranda warnings, he 
confessed on two occasions to killing a pizza parlor 
owner during an armed robbery. At trial, Dunaway 
moved to suppress those statements as well as sketches 
which he had drawn during his detention. A New 
York appellate court upheld the admissibility of the 
statements and sketches, even though the police 
lacked probable cause to arrest Dunaway. The court 
stated: "Law enforcement officials may detain an in-
dividual upon reasonable suspicion for questioning 
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman 
Having found the detention invalid, the Court next 
considered whether the evidence derived from the de-
tention should be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous 
tree." Under that doctrine, the contested evidence 
would be admissible only if the taint of the illegal 
police conduct had been sufficiently attentuated. See 
Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In elaborat-
ing on the attenuation doctrine in Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590 (1975), the Court identified several 
critical factors: "The temporal proximity of the ar-
rest and the confession, the presence of intervening 
circumstances( ... and particularly, the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct ... " /d. at 
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603-04. Applying these factors, the Court concluded 
that Dunaway was "admittedly seized without prob-
able cause in the hope that something might turn up, 
and confessed without any intervening event of signif-
icance." qq. S.Ct. at 2259. Thus, the Court ruled that 
the evidence should have been suppressed. As in 
Brown, the reading of Miranda rights did not change 
the result. "To admit petitioner's confession in such 
a case would allow law enforcement officers to violate 
the Fourth Amendment with impunity, safe in the 
knowledge that they could wash their hands in the 
'procedural safeguards' of the Fifth."' /d. at 2260, 
quoting Comment, 25 Emory L.J. 227, 238 (1976). 
The Court also considered the applicability of the 
Terry doctrine to automobile stops. In Delaware v. 
Prouse, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979), police seized marijuana 
in plain view from the defendant's automobile during 
a "routine" traffic stop. At a suppression hearing, the 
seizing officer "testified that prior to stopping the 
vehicle he had observed neither traffic or equipment 
violations nor any suspicious activity, and that he 
made the stop only in order to check the driver's 
license and registration." /d. at 1394. The state ar-
gued that its "interest in discretionary spot checks as 
a means of ensuring the safety of its roadways out-
weighs the resulting intrusion on the privacy and 
security of the persons detained." /d. at 1397. The 
Supreme Court held that "stopping an automobile 
and detaining its occupants constitutes a 'seizure' 
within the meaning of the [Fourth and Fourteenth] 
Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the resulting detention quite brief." /d. 
at 1396. The Court also recognized the state's "vital 
interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so 
are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these 
vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that li-
censing, registration, and vehicle inspections require-
ments are being observed." /d. at 1398. Nevertheless, 
the Court found the practice of randomly stopping 
automobiles unconstitutional. In reaching this result, 
the Court questioned the efficacy of random stops 
as a means of promoting the state's interest, noted the 
availability of alternative methods of enforcement, 
and recognized the substantial interference with per-
sonal liberty and security involved in random stops. 
The Court was especially concerned about the "stan-
dard less and unconstrained discretion" entrusted to 
the police in the context of random stops. 
-- Two additional points deserve mention. First, the 
Court's holding does not cover a situation in which 
the police have "articulable and reasonable suspicion" 
of a traffic offense. /d. at 1401. Second, the holding 
"does not preclude ... States from developing 
methods of spot checks that involve less intrusion or 
that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of dis-
cretion. Questioning of all on-coming traffic at road-
block-type stops is one possible alternative." /d. 
Thus, the Court appears to be endorsing the distinc-
tion between random stops and fixed checkpoint 
stops that it had earlier formulated in border patrol 
cases. Compare U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543 ( 1976) (upholding fixed checkpoint stops), with 
U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (invali-
dating roving patrol stops). 
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The Terry doctrine was also implicated in Brown v. 
Texas, 99 S.Ct. 2637 (1979), which involved a "stop 
and identify" statute. El Paso police stopped Brown 
in a high crime area, requesting him to identify him-
self and explain what he was doing. After refusing to 
answer, he was arrested for violating a Texas statute, 
which provided that a"person commits an offense if 
he intentionally refuses to report or gives a false report 
of his name and residence address to a police officer 
who has lawfully stopped him and requested the in-
formation." Tex. Penal Code §38.02{a). The Court, 
in a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice 
Burger, reversed the conviction. According to the 
Court, Brown's detention was "a seizure of his person 
subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment," 99 S.Ct. at 2640, and since the record failed 
to establish the existence of "a reasonable suspicion, 
based on objective facts, that the individual [was] in-
volved in criminal activity," the conviction violated 
Fourth Amendment guarantees. /d. at 2641. 
The constitutionality of the statute, however, was 
not addressed. The statute applies only if a person is 
"lawfully stopped." If, for example, the El Paso po-
lice stopped Brown based on reasonable suspicion and 
he then refused to identify himself or answer ques-
tions, could he validly be convicted under the Texas 
statute? The Court left this issue unresolved; in a 
footnote the Court remarked: "We need not decide 
whether an individual may be punished for refusing 
to identify himself in the context of a lawful investi-
gatory stop which satisfies Fourth Amendment re-
quirements."· /d. at 2641 n.3. The issue was likewise 
sidestepped in a companion case, Michigan v. DeFillip-
po, 99 S.Ct. 2627 (1979), which involved a similar 
provision. Nevertheless, Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justices Marshall and Stevens, confronted the issue in 
his dissent. His answer was unequivocal: "[I] ndivid-
uals accosted by th~ police on the basis merely of 
reasonable suspicion have a right not to be searched, a 
right to remain silent and, as a corollary, a right not 
to be searched if they choose to remain silent." /d. at 
2636. 
For an excellent discussion of stop and frisk law, 
see 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 1-175 (1979). 
The Warrant Clause 
In Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 99 S.Ct. 2319 
(1979), the Court had occasion to examine two as-
pects of the warrant clause- the particularity re-
quirement and the neutrality of the issuing magistrate. 
In that case two films purchased from the defendant's 
adult bookstore were viewed by a state magistrate and 
found to violate New York obscenity laws. A search 
warrant for the seizure of other copies of these films 
was then issued by the magistrate. The warrant, how-
ever, was not limited to the two films. It also author-
ized the seizure of additional material determined to 
be obscene by the magistrate at the time of the search. 
Accompanying the police to the store, the magistrate 
examined numerous films and magazines. Those 
which he found to be obscene were seized. A total of 
397 magazines and 431 reels of film were seized dur-
ing a six hour search. These items were subsequently 
added to the original warrant. After indictment, the 
defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized dur-
ing the search. 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion 
authored by the Chief Justice, held the warrant viola-
tive of the Fourth Amendment which provides that 
"no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause ... 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized." The Court 
commented: 
Based on the conclusionary statement of the police in-
vestigator that other similarly obscene materials would 
be found at the store, the warrant left it entirely to the 
discretion of the officials conducting the search to de- _ 
cide what items were likely obscene and to accomplish 
their seizure: The Fourth Amendment does not permit 
such action .... Nor does the Fourth Amendment 
countenance open-ended warrants, to be completed 
while a search is being conducted and items seized or 
after the seizure has been carried out. /d. at 2324. 
Moreover, the participation of the magistrate ran 
afoul of another constitutional procedure. According 
to the Court, the magistrate had abandoned his posi-
tion of "neutrality and detachment" because he "al-
lowed himself to become a member, if not the leader 
of the search party which was essentially a police 
operation ... [ H] e was not acting as a judicial officer 
but as an adjunct law-enforcement officer." /d. at 
2325. 
Exigent Circumstances and the Automobile Exception 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that for a 
search to be reasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, it generally must be conducted !l pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause by 
"" a neutral and detached magistrate. Thus, although 
the Court has recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, they are "jealously and carefully drawn." 
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 ( 1958). 
One of the more important exceptions involves the 
so-called "automobile exception." See Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132 (1925). Under this exception, the po-
lice may lawfully stop and search an automobile 
without a warrant if they have probable cause to be-
lieve the car contains contraband or evidence of a 
crime. The mobility of the car, in effect, creates an 
"exigent circumstance" which is thought to justify 
dispensing with the protections afforded by a search 
warrant. If the automobile is not mobile, however, 
this exception may not be applicable. See Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), 
the Court again considered a search involving an auto-
mobile. In Chadwick the defendants were arrested 
immediately after they had placed a footlocker con-
taining marihuana in the trunk of a car. Since the 
po)ice had probable cause, the arrests of the defend-
ants and the seizure of the locker were valid. The 
locker, however, was not opened until after it had 
been transported to the stationhouse. Before the Su-
preme Court, the Government proposed a warrant ex-
ception for all movable personal property seized in a 
public place upon probable cause. In effect, the 
Government was attempting to extend the automobile 
exception to all personal property. The Court refused 
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to sanction such a broad based exception. Moreover, 
the actual search in Chadwick could not be sustained 
on an exigency rationale. Since the police had exclu-
sive control of the footlocker at the time of the 
search, "there was not the slightest danger that the 
footlocker or its contents could have been removed 
before a valid search warrant could be obtained." /d. 
at 13. 
Last term, the Court in Arkansas v. Sanders, 99 
S.Ct. 2586 ( 1 979), considered the applicability of 
Chadwick to a search of a suitcase found during a 
valid automobile search. Unlike Chadwick, the search 
in Sanders occurred at the time the automobile was 
searched. The state argued that the automobile ex-
ception, and not Chadwick, applied. While recogniz-
ing that a "closed suitcase in the trunk of an auto-
mobile may be as mobile as the vehicle in which it 
rides," the Court pointed out that "the exigency of 
mobility must be assessed at the point immediately 
before the search .... " /d. at 2593. Since the suit-
case was "securely within [police] control" at that 
time, no exigency existed and thus a warrant was re-
quired. "Where- as in the present case- the police, 
without endangering themselves or risking loss of evi-
dence, lawfully have detained one suspected of crimi-
nal activity and secured his suitcase, they s(10uld delay 
the search thereof until after judicial approval has 
been obtained." /d. at 2594. 
See generally, Moylan, The Automobile Exception: 
What it is and What it is not- A Rationale in Search 
of a Clearer Label, 27 Mercer L. Rev. 987 (1976). 
Standing 
One of the most important decisions handed down 
by the Court last term dealt with a defendant's stand-
ing to object to illegally seized evidence. In Rakas v. 
Illinois, 99 S.Ct. 421 (1979), a police officer spotted 
a car which he suspected was the getaway car in are-
cent robbery. After stopping the car and ordering the 
occupants out, the officer found rifle shells in a 
locked glove compartment and a sawed-off shotgun 
under the front seat. The defendants' motion to sup-
press these items was denied because, according to 
the trial court, they lacked standing. 
The defendants argued before the Supreme Court 
that they were "legitimately on the premises" at the 
time of the search and they therefore had standing 
under the rule first announced in Jones v. U.S., 362 
U.S. 257 ( 1 960). Prior to Rakas, the legitimately-on-
the-premises rule had been one of the mainstays of 
the standing doctrine. Nevertheless, the Court rE!pU-
diated the rule, stating that "the phrase 'legitimately 
on the premises' coined in jones creates too broad a 
gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights." 
99 S.Ct. at 429. Instead, the Court relied upon the 
substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine of "reason-
able expectations of privacy" in determining the con-
stitutionality of the search. The Court concluded that 
the defendants' rights had not been infringed since 
they had "made no showing that they had any legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment 
or area under the seat of the car in which they were 
merely passengers. Like the trunk ofan automobile, 
these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger 
simply would not normally have a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy." !d. at 433. 
From a defense perspective, the most important as-
pect of Rokas is that it involves only one approach to 
standing- the legitimately-on-the-premises rule. 
Other methods of establishing standing were left un-
touched by the opinion. First, the defendants could 
have gained standing by claiming an interest in the 
items seized, either ownership or possession of the 
shells or shotgun. The Rokas Court repeatedly em-
phasized that the defendants had not asserted such an 
interest. /d. at 433. See also id. at 423 & 430 n.11. 
Moreover, had the defendants lost the suppression 
motion, the state would have been precluded from 
introducing the defendant's assertions of interest in 
its case-in-chief. See Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 377 
(1968). Second, had the defendants claimed an inter-
est in the place searched- ownership or possession of 
the automobile, they would have met the standing re-
quirement, since reasonable expectations of privacy 
are created under these circumstances. Again, the 
Court noted that the defendants "asserted neither a 
property nor a possessory interest in the automobile 
.... " !d. at 433. Third, the Rokas decision addressed 
the narrow issue of a passenger's standing to object to 
searches of specific places, the glove compartment 
and the area under the seat. (The Court also indicat-
ed that a car trunk would be treated similarly.) 
Whether the same result would have been reached had 
the items been seized from the top of the seat or 
from the floor of the car was left unresolved. !d. 434 
n.17. Finally, Rokas did not examine another aspect 
of the jones decision -automatic standing. See id. 
at 426 n.4. Where a defendant is charged with a pos-
sessory offense, standing is automatic. Rei iance on 
the automatic standing rule may be unwise, however, 
since its continued validity has been questioned in 
another case. See Brown v. U.S., 411 U.S. 223, 228-
29 ( 1973). See generally, 3 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure 543-612 (1979). 
Electronic Eavesdropping 
The Court decided two cases involving electronic 
surveillance. In Dalia v. U.S., 99 S.Ct. 1682 (1979), 
the Court held that neither the Fourth Amendment 
nor Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§2510-20 (1976), are violated 
by a covert entry to install a listening device where 
the eavesdropping has been judicially authorized. The 
circuit courts of appeal had divided on this issue. 
Compare U.S. v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 
1978); U.S. v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1978); 
U.S. v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977), with 
U.S. v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977); In re 
U.S.~ 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Agrusa, 
541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976). 
Addressing the Fourth Amendment issue, the 
Court stated: "It is well established that law enforce-
ment officers may break and enter to execute a search 
warrant where such entry is the only means by which 
the warrant effectively may be executed." !d. at 
1688. In addition, the Court held that Congress in-
tended to authorize surreptitious entries when it en-
acted Title Ill even though the statute "does not ex-
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plicitly refer to covert entry .... " /d. at 1689. Fi-
nally, the Court held that the manner of entry need 
not be specified in the order authorizing the eaves-
dropping. !d. at 1694. 
In Smith v. Maryland, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979), the 
Court focused on police use of a pen register, a me-
chanical device which records the numbers dialed 
from a telephone but not the conversation. In U.S. v. 
New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), the 
Court had held that Title Ill did not apply to pen 
registers. In Smith the Court ruled that the Fourth 
Amendment was also inapplicable. Citing Katz v. 
U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court held that a per-
son does not have "a legitimate expectation of priva-
cy" regarding the numbers dialed from his or her tele-
phone. The effect of Smith and New York Telephone 
Co. is to remove all restrictions from the police use of 
pen registers. 
For a comprehensive treatment of electronic sur-
veillance, see Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance, 
(1977). 
POLICE INTERROGATIONS 
The Court decided two cases last term dealing with 
police interrogation practices, both of which required 
an examination of the waiver of rights mandated by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ( 1966). In North 
Carolina v. Butler, 99 S.Ct. 1755 (1979), the defend-
ant was informed of his Miranda rights after his arrest. 
In addition, he read the FBI's "Advice of Rights" 
form and stated that he understood those rights. Al-
though he refused to sign the waiver at the bottom of 
the form, he nonetheless told the agents: "I will talk 
to you but I am not signing any form." /d. at 1756. 
Subsequently he made incriminating statements 
which he later sought to exclude at a suppression 
hearing. On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court 
held that the statements were obtained in violation of 
Miranda because an express waiver was not secured 
from the defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court, how-
ever, declined to accept such "an inflexible per se 
rule." /d. at 1758. The Court upheld the waiver in 
Butler, but nevertheless emphasized the heavy burden 
that the prosecution must carry to establish a valid 
waiver: 
An express written or oral statement of waiver of the 
right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually 
strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but it is not 
inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish 
waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather 
whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived 
the rights delineated in the Miranda case. As was un-
equivocally said in Miranda, mere silence is not enough. 
That does not mean that the defendant's silence, coupled 
with an understanding of his rights and a course of con-
duct indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion 
that a defendant has waived his righ:ts. The courts must 
presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the 
prosecution's burden is great; but in at least some cases 
waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and 
words of the person interrogated. /d. at 1757. 
In the second Miranda case, Fare v. Michael C., 99 
S.Ct. 2560 (1979). a juvenile requested to see his pro-
bation officer during a police interrogation. The juve-
nile had been taken into custody after he became im-
plicated in a murder. After being advised of his Mi-
randa rights, he was asked if he wished to give up his 
right to have an attorney present. At that point, he 
requested the presence of his probation officer. The 
police refused to honor this request, but again in-
~ formed him of his right to have an attorney present. 
U" He waived that right and made an incriminating state-
ment, which was subsequently admitted into evidence 
by the juvenile court. On appeal the Supreme Court 
of California held that a juvenile's request to see his 
probation officer constituted a per se invocation of 
Fifth Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed. According to the Court, an attorney's role in 
protecting a client's Fifth Amendment rights differs 
markedly from that of a probation officer. "A proba-
tion officer simply is not necessary, in the way an at-
torney is, for the protection of legal rights of the ac-
cused, juvenile or adult. He is significantly handi-
capped by the position he occupies in the juvenile sys-
tem from serving as an effective protector of the 
rights of a juvenile suspected of a crime." /d. at 2570. 
Hence, a juvenile's waiver of Miranda rights should 
be judged by the same totality of circumstances ap-
proach that is applied to adults. This is not to suggest, 
however, that a juvenile's age and limited experience 
would not play a significant part in that determina-
tion. As the Court noted: "Where the age and exper-
ience of a juvenile indicate that his request for his pro-
bation officer or his parents is, in fact, an invocation 
of his right to remain silent, the totality approach will 
allow the court the necessary flexibility to take this 
into account in making a waiver determination." /d. 
ll at 2572. 
~ See generally, G ian nell i, Pol ice Interrogations and 
Confessions, 2 Public Defender Rptr. (May-June 
1979). 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Grand Jury- Racial Discrimination 
In Rose v. Mitchell, 99 S.Ct. 2993 (1979), defend-
ants challenged the systematic exclusion of blacks 
from the grand jury and the selection of the grand 
__ jury foreman on equal protection grounds. The case 
is significant because it rejects two arguments that 
would have inhibited equal protection attacks on 
grand jury selection procedures. First, the state ar-
gued that since the defendants had been found guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt by a constitutionally valid 
petit jury they should be precluded from raising the 
equal protection issue. The Court refused to accept 
this argument, stating: "Discrimination on the basis of 
race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in 
the administration of justice. Selection of members 
of a grand jury because they are of one race and not 
another destroys the appearance of justice and there-
by casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process 
... The harm is not only to the accused, indicted as 
~e is by a jury from which a segment of the commun-
Ity has been excluded. It is to society as a whole." 
~--1~. at 3000. Furthermore, even though other reme-
dies are available to redress such violations; permitting 
challenges by criminal defendants has been the princi-
p~l method of vindicating this type of constitutional 
Violation. /d. at 3001. 
5 
Similarly, the Court rejected the state's argument 
that federal habeas review should be foreclosed to a 
state prisoner alleging discrimination in the selection 
of a grand jury. In effect, the state was asking the 
Court to extend its decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465 (1976), which foreclosed habeas review of 
Fourth Amendment claims "absent a showing that 
the state prisoner was denied an opportunity for a full 
and fair litigation of that claim at trial and on direct 
review." /d. at 494. 
First Amendment - Closure Orders 
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S.Ct. 2898 
( 1979), the Court returned to the free press-fair trial 
controversy. Previously, in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 
U.S. 333 ( 1 966), the Court had overturned a convic-
tion because of the trial court's failure to take affirma-
tive steps to minimize the effects of prejudicial pre-
trial publicity. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 
U.S. 539 ( 1 976), the Court struck down a "gag order" 
prohibiting the reporting of evidence adduced at an 
open preliminary hearing. According to the Court, 
such prior restraint on speech, under the circumstan-
ces of that case, infringed First Amendment guaran-
tees. The Court, however, left open the issue of whe-
ther a trial court could close pretrial proceedings to 
protect against prejudicial pretrial publicity: /d. at 
564 n.8. 
Gannett Co. presented the Court with that very is-
sue. In that case defendants moved to exclude the 
public and press from a pretrial suppression hearing. 
When the trial court granted the motion, a newspaper 
challenged the ruling on First, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds. In reviewing these challenges, 
the Supreme Court held that the "constitutional guar-
antee of a public trial is for the benefit of the defend-
ant," 99 S.Ct. at 2906, and "that members of the pub-
lic have no constitutional right under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal trials." 
/d. at 2911. Moreover, without deciding whether the 
press and public had a First Amendment right of ac-
cess to pretrial proceedings, the Court held that First 
Amendment rights had not been violated in this par-
ticular case since the trial court considered First· 
Amendment interests and only closed the proceedings 
after determining that there was a reasonable proba-
bility of prejudice to the defendants. /d. at 2912. In 
addition, the denial of access "was not absolute but 
only temporary," a transcript of the suppression hear-
ing having been released after the danger of prejudice 
had dissipated. /d. 
Three concurring opinions were written and should 
prove critical to future adjudication of this issue. 
Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the pretrial as~ 
pect of the case was of critical importance. Thus, 
closure of a trial itself would present a different issue 
for him. Justice Powell addressed the First Amend-
ment issue reserved by the majority opinion. In his 
view, a First Amendment right of access exists but is 
not absolute. Under the circumstances of the case be-
fore the Court, Justice Powell believed that the trial 
court correctly dealt with the conflict between First 
and Sixth Amendment rights. Justice Rehnquist op-
posed the Powell view; he found no First Amendment 
right of access and employed sweepin9 lang~~ge in 
stating the consequences of the Courts de~1s1on: 
" [ 1] f the parties agree on a closed proceedmg, the 
trial court is not required by the Sixth Amendment 
to advance any reason whatsoever for declining to 
open a pretrial hearing or trial t? the publi~." /d. at 
2918. It is noteworthy that he 1ncluded trw/ as well 
as pretrial proceedings in his statemen~. '!"hether the 
Rehnquist view would command a majonty o_f !he 
Court seems doubtful in light of the other opm1ons, 
including a vigorous dissent issued by four Justices. 
Jury Trial 
Two cases decided by the Court last term presented 
jury trial issues.· Both cases involved furth_e~ develop-
ment of prior decisions. In Burch v. Lou1s1ana, 99 
S.Ct. 1623 (1979), the Court examined a state proce-
dure that permitted conviction by a nonunanimous 
verdict of a six-person jury in nonpetty offense cases. 
While the Court had held previously that a 12-person 
jury was not constitutionally required, Williams v. 
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 ( 1970), it had also decided that 
a five-person jury was constitutionally deficient. Bal-
lew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). The Court had_ 
also decided that unanimous verdicts were not consti-
tutionally mandated in noncapital cases, upholding a 
10-2 verdict in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 
(1972), and a 9-3 verdict in Apodaca v. Or~gon, _406 
U.S. 404 (1972). As the Court noted, the 1ssue m 
Burch "lies at the intersection of our decision con-
cerning jury size and unanimity." 99 s.qt. at 1?27. 
The Court unanimously agreed that a split verd1ct by 
a six-person jury violated Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees. 
The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross 
section of the community was the focal point of Dur-
en v. Missouri, 99 S.Ct. 664 (1979). In 1975 the 
Court had held that the systematic exclusion of fe-
males during the jury selection process resulted in a 
jury pool which was not "reasona~ly represent~tive" 
of the community and therefore v1olated the fa1r 
cross section requirement. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 
U.S. 522 (1975). The system struck down in Taylor 
had required female jurors to file a written declara-
tion of their willingness to serve. The Missouri system 
challenged in Duren, which provided for an a~tomatic 
exemption for females, proved equally offensive to 
the fair cross section requirement. While females rep-
resented 54% of the adult population, they accounted 
for only 15.5% of the jury pool from which the de-
fendant's panel was selected. By demonstrating the 
critical role played by the automatic exemption in 
this process, the defendant met ~is burden ?f es~ab­
lishing a prima facie case of a fa1r eros~ sect1on vlol~­
tion. Since the state failed to offer ev1dence establish-
ing that the automatic exemption was not the cause_ 
of the underrepresentation or to advance a substantial 
justification for the exemption, the Court found a 
constitutional violation. 
Right of Confrontation 
Parker v. Randolph, 99 S.Ct. 2132 ( 1979), another 
case decided by the Court last term, turned on the de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. 
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Randolph is the progeny of an earlier landmark case, 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In that 
case, an accomplice's confession implicating Bruto~ 
was introduced at a joint trial. Even though the tnal 
judge instructed the jury that the confession co_uld 
only be considered in determining the acco_mpl1ce's 
guilt, the Supreme Court reversed. Accordmg to the 
Court: 
[T] here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury 
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and 
the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, 
that the practical and human limitations of the jury sys-
tem cannot be ignored .... Such a context is presented 
here where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial stat~ments of a co-defendantwho stands accused side-
by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread 
before the jury in a joint trial. /d. at 135-36. 
Since the Court found the instruction ineffective and 
the accomplice did not take the stand, Bruton was de-
prived of his right to confront the extrajudicial state-
ment. In subsequent cases the Court held Bruton 
binding upon the states and retroactive, Roberts v. 
Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), and subject to the 
harmless error doctrine. Harrington v. California, 395 
U.S. 250 (1969). The most significant of the post-
Bruton cases was Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 
(1971 ), which involved the applicability of Bruton to 
trials in which the accomplice testifies. The Court 
stated: "We conclude that where a codefendant takes 
the stand in his own defense, denies making an alleged 
out-of-court statement implicating the defendant, and 
proceeds to testify favorably to the defendant con-
cerning the underlying facts, the defendant has been 
denied no rigL [S protected by the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments." !d. at 629-30. 
With this backdrop the Court decided Parker v. 
Randolph. Unlike Bruton and O'Neil, th~ defendant 
in Parker had also confessed, thus presentmg the 
Court with the question of the applicability of Bruton 
to a case involving "Interlocking confessions." The 
courts of appeals had divided on this issue. Compare 
Hodgesv. Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1978); U.S. v. 
DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3rd Cir. 1976); cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 1038 (1977), with lgnaciov. Guam, 413 
F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 
(1970); Mack v. Maggio, 538 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 
1976). The plurality opinion in Parker distinguished 
Bruton. "The right protected in Bruton- the 'cone 
stitutional right of cross-examination,' ... -has far 
less practical value to a defendant who_ has confes~ed 
to the crime than to one who has consistently mam-
tained his innocence. Successfully impeaching a 
codefendant's confession on cross-examination would 
likely yield small advantage to the defend_ant whose 
own admission of guilt stands before the JUry unchal-
lenged." /d. at 2139. Consequently, the plurality 
found the Bruton rule inapplicable. 
As noted by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opin-
ion, the plurality opinion rests on two _dub}ous _a_s-
sumptions: "First, it ass,ur:'es th~t !he jury s _ab1l1ty to 
disregard a codefendants madm1ss1ble and highly p_re-
judicial confession is invariably increased by the exiS-
tence of a corroborating statement by the defendant. 
Second it assumes that all unchallenged confessions , 
by a defendant are equally reliable." /d. at 2145. It 
should be kept in mind that only four Justices joined 
in the plurality opinion. Three Justices dissented, 
Justice Powell did not participate in the decision, and 
flj Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment on 
\.:o. harmless error grounds. Justice Blackmun's opinion 
indicated that he did not share the plurality's view. 
Thus, the issue remains clouded and the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision applying Bruton to interlocking con-
fessions may still be controlling in Ohio. See Hodges 
v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1978). 
Impeachment Use of Immunized Testimony 
In Harrisv. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the 
Court sanctioned the impeachment use of statements 
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966). Accord, Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 
(1975). Last term in New Jersey v. Portash, 99 S.Ct. 
1292 ( 1979), the state argued that the Harris ration-
ale also applied to the impeachment use of testimony 
given pursuant to a grant of immunity. Portash was 
granted immunity after indicating that he would claim 
his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination before a state grand jury. He was 
subsequently indicted for misconduct in office and 
extortion. At trial the defense sought a ruling pre-
cluding the state from using Portash's grand jury testi-
mony for the purpose of impeaching him. The trial 
judge ruled in favor of the state and consequently 
Portash did not testify. In addressing this issue, the 
Supreme Court distinguished statements that are the 
product of coercion from those taken in violation of 
~ Miranda. In Harris, which involved the latter situa-
tion, the Court found the incremental deterrent effect 
of the exclusionary rule outweighed by the "strong 
policy against countenancing perjury." /d. at 1297. 
Immunized testimony, on the other hand, 
is the essence of coerced testimony. In such cases there 
is no question whether physical or psychological pres-
sures overrode the defendant's will; the witness is told to 
talk or face the government's coercive sanctions, notably, 
a conviction for contempt .... Balancing of interests 
was thought to be necessary in Harris and Haas when the 
attempt to deter unlawful police conduct collided with 
the need to prevent perjury. Here, by contrast, we deal 
with the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination in its most pristine form. Balancing, there-
fore, is not simply unnecessary. It is impermissible. !d. 
Presumptions and Jury Instructions 
In Sandstrom v. Montana, 99 S.Ct. 2450 ( 1979), 
the defendant was charged with deliberate homicide. 
Under the applicable state law, the state was required 
to establish that the killing was committed purposely 
or knowingly. The prosecution requested a jury in-
struction that provided: "The law presumes that a 
person intends the ordinary consequences of his vol-
untary acts." When the defense objected on due pro-
cess grounds and offered federal decisions in support 
•.··. of the objection, the judge replied: "You can give 
, those to the Supreme Court. The objection is over-
J ruled." /d. at 2454. The defendant did just that and 
the Supreme Court reversed. 
The Court found that the jury could have con-
. strued the instruction in ways which would violate 
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constitutional principles. "First, a reasonable jury 
could well have interpreted the presumption as 'con-
clusive,' that is, not technically as a presumption at 
all, but rather as an irrebuttable direction of the court 
to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering 
the presumption." /d. at 2456. Under these circum-
stances the jury could have "concluded that they 
were directed to find against the defendant on the 
element of intent" once they found that the defend-
ant caused the victim's death. !d. at 2459. Thus, the 
state was not required to prove "beyond a reasonable 
doubt ... every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
... charged" as required by due process. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
"Alternatively, the jury may have interpreted the 
instruction as a direction to find intent upon proof of 
the defendant's voluntary actions (and their "ordina-
ry" consequences), unless the defendant proved the 
contrary by some quantum of proof which may well 
have been considerably greater than 'some' evidence -
thus effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on 
the element of intent." 99 S.Ct. 2456. Under these 
circumstances the instruction would have contravened 
the Court's decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 
684 (1975). 
The Ohio jury instruction on "natural consequen-
ces" is found at Ohio Jury Instructions- Criminal 
409.56 (Provisional 197 4). See generally, Koosed & 
Aynes, Constitutional Challenges to Placing the Bur-
den of Proof of Affirmative Defenses Upon the Ac-
cused, 2 Public Defender Rptr. (Jan.-Feb. 1979). 
In County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 99 S.Ct. 
2213 (1979), an automobile in which three male 
adults and a 16-year-old girl were riding, was stopped 
for a speeding violation by the police. Two handguns 
were spotted in the girl's handbag, and a subsequent 
search of the trunk revealed a machine gun and 
heroin. All occupants were charged with illegal pos-
session of weapons and heroin. The state's case was 
buttressed by a New York statute which provided, 
with certain exceptions, that the presence of a firearm 
in an automobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal 
possession by all persons then occupying the vehicle. 
N.Y. Penal L. §265.15(3). A majority of the Court 
upheld the presumption as applied to the facts of the 
case. 
Allen represents a departure from the Court's prior 
decisions. In a series of cases involving criminal pre-
sumptions, the Court appeared to have established 
two principles concerning the prosecution's use of a 
presumption which relates to elements of the charged 
offense. First, notwithstanding the label, a criminal 
presumption could have only the effect of a permis-
sive inference. See C. McCormick, Evidence 817 (2d 
ed. 1972) ("[l]t is unlikely that the Court would ap-
prove the use of a presumption in a criminal case 
other than as a permissive inference."). Second, there 
must be a "rational connection between the fact 
proved and the ultimate fact presumed .... " Tot v. 
U.S., 319 U.S. 463,467 (1943). Accord, U.S. v. 
Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); U.S. v. Romano, 382 
U.S. 136 (1965). As developed further in Leary v. 
U.S., 395 U.S. 6 ( 1969), a rational connection means 
at the very least, "that the presumed fact is more like-
ly than not to flow from the proved fact on which it 
is made to depend." /d. at 36. Whether a higher stan-
dard - beyond a reasonable doubt- is constitutional-
ly required was left open by Leary and subsequent 
cases. !d. at 36 n.64; Turner v. U.S., 396 U.S. 398, 
416 (1970); Barnesv. U.S., 412 U.S. 837,842-43 
(1973). 
The Allen majority reworked both principles. It 
recognized two types of presumptions: mandatory 
and permissive. The constitutionality of permissive 
presumptions, as in Allen, are to be examined asap-
plied in a particular case; the "more likely than not" 
standard controls. In contrast, the constitutionality 
of mandatory presumptions are to be examined 
facially; the beyond reasonable doubt standard con-
trols. The majority's "novel approach," as aptly de-
scribed by the dissent, id. at 2234, will introduce 
more confusion into an area already permeated with 
confusion. For example, a mandatory presumption 
in a civil case shifts, at least, the burden of production. 
Thus, if no evidence controverting the presumed fact 
is offered, the party in whose favor the presumption 
operates is entitled to a directed verdict on that issue. 
In the criminal context, however, a defendant cannot 
suffer a directed verdict. Thus, although mandatory 
presumptions are recognized by the Allen majority, 
their meaning and effect remains clouded. 
See generally, C. McCormick, Evidence ch. 36 (2d 
ed. 1972); 21 C. Wright & 1<. Graham, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure 684-758 (1977); 1 J. Weinstein & 
M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 303 ( 1978). 
Right to Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel was held 
binding upon the states in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963). In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 
25 (1972), the right to counsel was extended to all 
cases in which imprisonment is imposed. The exact 
scope of the right was left open by the Argersinger 
opinion. Lastterm, inScottv.lllinois,99S.Ct.1158 
(1979), the Court clarified this issue. Scott was 
charged with petty theft, an offense which carried a 
maximum penalty of a $500 fine and a prison term of 
less than a year. Upon conviction, Scott was fined 
$50. He argued that his right to counsel had been 
violated because the offense for which he was tried 
authorized imprisonment as a sanction. Rejecting this 
argument, the Court held that actual imprisonment, 
rather than authorized imprisonment, triggered the 
right to counsel. 
See generally, S. Krantz, Right to Counsel in Crim-
inal Cases: The Mandate of Argersinger v. Hamlin 
(1976). 
HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW 
In Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), 
the Supreme Court set forth the standard for judging 
the sufficiency of evidence in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. Under that standard, a federal court 
could reverse a state conviction only if there was no 
evidence to support the conviction. Subsequently, in 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court de-
clared for the first time that due process protects a 
criminal defendant against conviction "except upon 
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proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact neces-
sary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 
!d. at 364. The continued validity of the "no evi-
dence" rule after Winship was raised in Freeman v. 
Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 1111 ( 1977) (dissent from de- ~ 
nial of certiorari). In Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S.Ct. 
2781 (1979), the Court held that Winship compelled 
the overruling of the no evidence standard. "After 
Winship the critical inquiry on review of the sufficien-
cy of the evidence to support a criminal conviction 
must be not simply to determine whether the jury 
was properly instructed, but to determine whether 
the record evidence would reasonably support a find-
ing of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." !d. at 2789. 
The import of jackson would seem to go beyond the 
context of federal habeas review. The arguments ad-
vanced by the Court apply with equal force to direct 
review by state appellate courts and to directed ver-
dict determinations by state trial courts. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Publications 
Professor Wayne LaFave, the leading authority on 
Fourth Amendment law, has recently published a 
three volume work entitled: Search and Seizure, A 
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (West Publishing 
Co. 1979). This work is the most comprehensive 
treatment of the subject yet published. The editor of 
this Reporter is co-author of another West publica-
tion: lmwinkelried, Giannelli, Gilligan & Lederer, 
Criminal Evidence ( 1979). Recent articles of interest ~ 
include: Lee, The Grand Jury in Ohio: An Empirical 
Study, 4 U. Dayton L. Rev. 325 (1979); Entrapment 
in the State of Ohio, 5 Ohio Northern L. Rev. 642 
(1979). 
' 
Allied Offenses of Similar Import 
The Court held that the offenses of sale of heroin 
and possession for sale of heroin under R.C. 
3719.20(8) and R.C. 3719.20(A) are "allied offenses 
of similar import" within the meaning of R.C. 
2941.25(A) "when both charges arise from the same 
transaction, and are predicated upon identical evi-
dence." Consequently, the defendant's conviction for 
the lesser offense of possession for sale was vacated. 
State v. Roberts, No. 37848, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App. 
(1979). 
Privacy Act Exclusionary Rule 
Although the Court found no material violation of 
the defendant's right to privacy, it noted that the use 
of a welfare recipient's social security number in vio-
lation of Section 7(b) of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 
U.S.C. §552(a), to detect welfare fraud would require 
the suppression of the evidence derived from the vio-
lation. In applying the exclusionary rule to such 
statutory violations, the Court concluded that "evi-
dence obtained in violation of a statute is obtained in ~ 
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment ... "and must be suppressed. State v. 
McMiller, No. CR-40584, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. C.P. 
(1979). 
